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 Introduction 
 It’s almost like living with a dead person. Some people say, ‘you’ve 
still got her’. No I haven’t. (Mother of a daughter in a permanent 
vegetative state, caring for her at home.) 
 I only thought in terms of life and death ... not this, this in-between. 
(Father of a son, who had been in a minimal conscious state.) 
 And I’d thought of every single possibility. But I hadn’t thought of 
this one. Because I didn’t even know it existed. (Sister of a woman in 
a permanent vegetative state.) 
 These comments encapsulate some common themes in how people 
describe having a severely brain-injured relative in a coma-like condi-
tion, medically known as a ‘disorder of consciousness’. In the past it was 
highly unusual for such individuals to survive very long after the initial 
trauma that caused their injury. However, the emergence of modern 
medical technologies, and how they are deployed, has led to the creation 
of new long-term conditions including the ‘vegetative state’ (in which 
the patient shows no awareness at all) and the ‘minimally conscious 
state’ (in which the the patient displays some intermittent and minimal 
awareness). These conditions are modern phenomena – the vegetative 
diagnostic category was first created in the early 1970s (Jennett and 
Plum, 1972) and the ‘minimally conscious state’ [MCS] was only defined 
in 2002 (Giacino et al., 2002). Patients with disorders of consciousness 
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disrupt previous ways of understanding life. The family may experience 
their vegetative or minimally conscious relative as ‘present but absent’, 
‘living, but dead’, making comments such as ‘this is no life’ and ‘my son 
is gone’ – and experiencing a sense of loss and grief that may be ‘like a 
death’, although not a death. 
 In analysing families’ talk about death in relation to severe brain injury 
and disorders of consciousness, this chapter combines a social construc-
t ionist approach – addressing the way new medical technologies generate 
dominant definitions of death and dying – with a social construct ivist 
approach – focusing on the agency of relatives in generating constructions 
of their relative in relation to the vegetative and minimally conscious 
diagnoses. We explore what family members’ accounts tell us about ‘ordi-
nary understandings’ of death, the disruption of such understandings 
brought about by the use of medical technologies which ‘rescue’ and 
sustain physiological life with no (or minimal) consciousness and the 
ways in which family members negotiate such disruptions. 
 The social construction of ‘the vegetative state’ 
 Death is sometimes seen to defy social constructionist/ivist theo-
rising – death is the ultimate, non-negotiable, purely natural, ‘fact of 
life’ (Carpentier and Van Brussel, 2012). However, thanatologists have 
detailed the changing social nature of death, who ‘owns’ death and 
where it occurs (Illich, 1975; Aries, 1981) as well as highlighting how 
new ‘life-sustaining’ technologies have led to new definitions of death 
and how the space between life and death is historically and socially 
constructed and contested (Lock, 2002). ‘Brain death’ is one obvious, 
and well analysed, example but the most profound disability that can 
result from  surviving severe brain injury but which does  not (currently) 
result in a diagnosis of death is the ‘vegetative state’ (sometimes now 
called ‘wakeful unresponsiveness’ – ‘wakeful’ because their eyes open, 
even if the patient can see nothing). It is this condition and the more 
‘borderline’ condition of ‘minimally conscious state’, and more specifi-
cally the construction of these conditions in terms of ‘in-between’ states 
of being, that is the focus of this chapter. 
 The vegetative and the minimally conscious state conditions cannot 
be isolated from a specific medical–material context. Increasing numbers 
of people are now surviving injuries caused by, for example, a car crash, 
sporting accident, assault, a cardiac arrest or an illness such as viral 
encephalitis (surviving both in the immediate aftermath and for years or 
decades afterwards). This is linked to late twentieth and early twenty-first 
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century developments in medical technologies (including resuscitation, 
artificial ventilation and the delivery of artificial hydration and nutri-
tion), which – combined with particular sets of social and political imper-
atives – have helped to save lives and improve recovery for some, but at 
the same time have ‘produced new neurological syndromes of severe, 
and usually irreversible, cognitive and motor disabilities’ (Cranford, 
2002, p. 129). Indeed, Kaufman and Morgan talk of new ‘technologi-
cally produced’ life forms – ‘liminal beings’ who ‘hover in an ambiguous 
zone’ and ‘force a remapping of the notions of life, death, and person’, 
throwing up new ethical and cultural debates (Kaufman and Morgan, 
2005, p. 330). There is now a large body of clinical literature debating the 
ethics of medical decision-making at the very borders of life (Abdennour 
et al., 2007; Carter and Leuthner, 2003; Gillett et al., 2010; Honeybul 
et al., 2011; Schaller and Kessler, 2006; Wilkinson and Savulescu, 2011). 
There is also an emerging literature on the sociological significance of 
these patients and their care (Bird-David and Israeli, 2010; Kaufman, 
2003, Kaufman and Morgan, 2005; Kitzinger and Kitzinger, 2013). From 
this, and related work on ‘brain death’ (Giacomini, 1997; Lock, 2002; 
Kaufman and Morgan, 2005; Youngner et al., 1999), it is clear that profes-
sionals and patients’ families are often troubled by the ethics of ‘life-
sustaining’ interventions for such patients and find it hard to make sense 
of patients who are neither fully alive nor unambiguously dead. 
 Alongside new medical technologies, allowing medical staff to keep 
patients alive and (clinical) debates on life-sustaining interventions, 
arose the urge to define the condition of the vegetative state – which 
returns us to the constructed nature of death. From a (dominant) 
biological paradigm, death is defined as the irreversible breakdown in 
the functioning of the organism as a whole: in that paradigm brain-dead 
patients are dead because they have lost consciousness and are machine-
dependent for functions such as breathing, but the patients in perma-
nently vegetative states [PVS] are alive because although they have lost 
consciousness, they maintain integrated autonomic physiological func-
tions (albeit machine-dependent for nutrition and hydration). However, 
critics point out that the dominant biological paradigm fails to capture 
the totality and complexity of the phenomenon of ‘death’. 
 As Holland points out: 
 Death is one of a handful of most weighty phenomena. It would be 
odd if concepts capturing such phenomena turn out to be simple 
and, unsurprisingly, we find that concepts such as life, love and 
liberty turn out to be complex, and their definitions contestable. But 
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in the biological account, the definition of death captures just one 
very straightforward, universally applicable idea – irreversible loss of 
organismic functioning – which is suspiciously simple. Conversely, 
consider concepts that are non-contentiously purely biological, such 
as the concepts of photosynthesis and osmosis; is it really plausible 
that the concept of death is, like these, purely biological? (Holland, 
2010, p. 112) 
 For the purposes of this chapter we are most interested in the obser-
vation by Holland that ‘whilst our ordinary understanding [of death] 
accommodates the biological definition, it also includes the thought 
that, for someone who has died, there will never again be anything it is 
like to be that person’ (Holland, 2010, p. 109). 
 It comes as no surprise, then, that family members often rearticulate 
and negotiate the notion of ‘consciousness’, which functions as a key 
signifier in dominant biological and medical definitions of death. Indeed, 
the situation is complicated by whether or not family members really 
believe that consciousness is entirely absent even in the patient’s present 
condition. Vegetative patients do not conform to the image of the ‘coma 
patient’ so often displayed in the media – they often do not appear to be 
unconscious in our usual understanding of what unconsciousness ‘looks 
like’. Vegetative patients usually have spontaneous respiration and circu-
lation (they are not dependent on machines to breathe or to keep their 
hearts beating) and they have sleep–wake cycles and while awake can 
open their eyes and may look toward a loud sound or stare at a visitor 
(medically called ‘visual fixation’). They also may withdraw from pain, 
cry, smile, groan and have a grasp reflex (which a visitor may experi-
ence as hand holding). Such patients may sometimes even say isolated 
words which, according to clinical experts, may reflect ‘the survival of 
“islands” of cortex, which are no longer part of the coherent thalmo-cor-
tical system required to generate awareness’ (RCP, 2013, p. 5). Families, 
however, may see such behaviours as evidence of awareness and ques-
tion clinical definitions. (For discussion of contestations around the diag-
nosis of consciousness see Nettleton et al., forthcoming.) This is further 
complicated by recent findings from scientists using new techniques of 
brain scanning that appear to detect brain activity in patients apparently 
unable to display any other signs (for example unable to blink answers 
to questions) (see Monti et al., 2010, and disputes about the representa-
tion of fMRI, e.g. Samuel and Kitzinger, 2013; Turner-Stokes et al., 2012). 
Families may believe the person ‘is in there’ and responding to them, and 
question the ability of experts at the bedside to detect this. 
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 In addition it is widely recognised (by both clinicians and families) 
that patients can be misdiagnosed as VS when in fact they are MCS 
(Andrews et al., 1996) and families often fear the patient may even be 
‘locked-in’ – fully conscious but unable to communicate in any way – 
and there have been some examples of misdiagnosis in such cases too 
(although this is much less likely). Distinguishing VS from MCS is 
particularly challenging because, by its very definition, MCS is charac-
terised by  inconsistency and MCS is also a  continuum (for example some 
patients display very, very minimal and very, very intermittent signs of 
consciousness). The creation of the VS/MCS boundary therefore, on one 
level, seeks to clarify the situation, but at the same time creates ‘a mirage 
of certainty’ – a ‘diagnostic illusory’ – which ‘does little to quell the 
confusions, anxieties, conundrums and conflicts experienced by rela-
tives, and some clinicians’ (Nettleton et al.,  forthcoming, p. 16). 
 Families’ understandings of their relative in a vegetative state are not 
only connected to – often contestations of – biomedical definitions of 
death and dying, but are also embedded in debates that go beyond the 
medical and biological sphere. The ‘permanent vegetative state’ has 
indeed a special significance and is often used as a ‘thought anchor’ 
in philosophical as well as theological theorising about life, death, and 
personhood. Analysing the ontological status of the patient in PVS (with 
irreversible, permanent loss of awareness of themselves or their envi-
ronment) is a useful endeavour for thinking through the philosophical 
implications for treatment (Holland et al., 2014). However, as we will 
show in this chapter, on another level this approach has limited use 
for families facing the day-to-day challenges of having a loved one in 
a disordered state of consciousness – trying to make sense of their own 
feelings and experience, and encounters with current legislation and 
practice as these play out over time and as the patient moves across 
different diagnostic categories. This is because in many theoretical 
accounts PVS is presented in a static way and imagined as an abstract 
ideal, without an engagement with the medico-legal context in which 
such states are created/emerge over the patient’s ‘pathway’ and discon-
nected from other states of disordered consciousness or what decisions 
have to be made or what ‘recovery’ can mean. One key issue is that the 
diagnosis of a disorder of consciousness is a  process , not a one-off event – 
the diagnosis of such a state as being ‘permanent’ is time dependent and 
embedded in debates about  when someone in a vegetative state can be 
defined as having ‘ irreversibly’ lost all capacity for consciousness (should 
it be after months, a year, or years?) and what interventions and tests 
should be tried (might another drug trial make a difference?). Guidelines 
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vary between countries. For example, in the US you can be defined as 
being in a ‘permanent’ vegetative state after showing no consciousness 
for three months after a ‘non traumatic injury’ (for example due to 
oxygen deprivation), whereas in the UK that label can only be applied 
after six months (RCP, 2013). In both countries patients can only be 
labelled as PVS after a year if the cause of their injury is ‘traumatic’ (such 
as due to a blow to the head). There are a few isolated examples of late 
recovery from PVS and it is known that people may sometimes evolve 
into full consciousness, after years or even decades in MCS (Fins et al., 
2007). Family members’ sense of the person as ‘alive’ or ‘dead’ will, in 
part, play out against this understanding of when loss of consciousness is 
‘irreversible’ – both according to the medics (depending on the country 
in which they live) and their own understanding of the treatment given 
and what the future holds. 
 Method 
 The research reported here is part of a larger ongoing study of family 
experiences of decision making in connection with a severely brain-in-
jured relative. We have also interviewed professionals in the field. Ethical 
approval was obtained from University of York and Cardiff University 
ethics committees and all interviews were conducted by one or other 
of the authors of this paper (both experienced in interviewing around 
highly sensitive subjects). Family research participants were recruited 
through advertising via support groups, websites and care homes asking 
people to talk to us about the experiences of decision making. We also 
recruited through our own social contacts (we have a severely brain-
injured sister), 1 through contacts made after giving formal presenta-
tions about our research and via snowball sampling. Once we received 
NHS ethics approval (from Berkshire Research Ethics Committee, REC 
reference number: 12/SC/0495) we were also able to recruit via consult-
ants, although all interviews took place off NHS premises (generally in 
people’s homes). 
 We interviewed a wide range of family members: adult children, 
parents, sisters, brothers, spouses and partners of the brain-injured 
person, as well as some other relatives involved in decision making (for 
example stepfather and sister-in-law). Most people were interviewed 
individually, but some asked to meet in pairs (for example a husband and 
wife asked to be interviewed together, as did a mother and daughter). We 
almost always conducted the interviews without other people present: 
exceptions were one interview at which a young child was present and 
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another which took place in the same room as the PVS daughter of the 
interviewee (who cared for her at home). 
 The interview schedule was deliberately wide-ranging, with open-
ended questions, prompts and follow-up questions employed to elicit 
detailed responses but also to allow people to tell their own stories, 
rather than adhering to a strict structure. The majority of interviews 
lasted between 2 and 4 hours (with breaks). In this article we focus on 
those parts of the interviews where participants implicitly or explicitly 
reflect on their relatives status as alive or dead. 
 We have interviewed 51 family members – their injured family 
member ranged from late teens to early sixties. Most of the brain injuries 
were caused by either road traffic or sporting accidents and most were 
traumatic rather than anoxic (oxygen deprivation) injuries. At the time 
of interview, the brain-injured persons had generally been kept alive for 
between two and ten years since the injury, and most had been diag-
nosed as ‘vegetative’ or ‘minimally conscious’ (although some had died, 
and some had recovered full consciousness, albeit with profound and 
multiple disabilities). 
 In addition, one interviewee reported the experience of having his 
daughter diagnosed as ‘brain dead’ and ‘switched off’, and another – 
interviewed because she had a relative who was vegetative – also reported 
an experience of the brain death of another family member. 
 Interviews were fully transcribed and, following discussion between 
the researchers, coded to identify themes and recurrent issues using a 
qualitative analysis software package (Dedoose). Issues pertaining to 
death which were attended to included: descriptions of ‘near death’ or 
the patient having ‘died’ and been ‘reanimated’ (for example through 
resuscitation), explicit or implicit accounts of the relationship between 
the patient’s current existence and death, expressed views about life-sus-
taining treatment and future death, and discussion of actual or planned 
funeral rituals. The authors analysed the data using thematic analysis 
to identify patterns (themes) within data (Braun and Clarke, 2006) and 
paid particular attention to diversity within the data and the ways in 
which people spoke about the relationship between the body and the 
soul/spirit/person and the terms they used to express ideas about life 
and death, (‘existence’, ‘breathing’, ‘being’ or ‘free’, ‘at peace’, ‘passed 
over’, ‘gone’). The data are replete with tensions, speculation and ambiv-
alences that are perhaps inevitable given the ways in which vegetative 
(and minimally conscious) states may disrupt standard constructions of 
life and death and the emotional complexity of family responses. In 
the data discussed in the analysis here we have tried to capture some of 
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these tensions, and to highlight both the commonalities and the diver-
sity of responses as our interviewees grapple with the challenges they 
confront. 
 In the analysis which follows we describe the reported experiences of 
the families who talked to us, on their own terms, contextualising these 
in relation to the medical, legal and ethical situations which they reflect 
and constitute. All data have been anonymised. Names of people and 
places are pseudonyms. (For full discussion on anonymising strategy see 
Saunders et al., 2014.) 
 Findings 
 This chapter explores questions such as: when is someone ‘dead’ or 
‘alive’? If someone has  not died – why not?  Should they be dead? What 
do such states of ‘in-between’ mean for relationships? What would it 
mean if they really did die – in terms of memory and commemoration? 
 When is someone ‘really dead’? 
 Two of our interviewees not only had experience of vegetative/mini-
mally conscious states, but  also had experienced a relative with a diag-
nosis of brain death – and during the interview they talked about the 
death of these relatives. Both described their somatically-maintained 
brain-dead relative as having been in some sense present, at least as a 
subject for ‘being with’ and saying goodbye to, even while accepting the 
diagnosis. One, for example, described how her husband got to be ‘actu-
ally dead’ only after his ‘life support’ was switched off and describes how 
important it was to be with him while he ‘died’. 
 Inga:  I said, ‘oh yes, I want to be in there’, the girls said they wanted 
to be. So they just removed the ventilator and he just lay there. 
And you could see – he was still attached to the monitor and 
you could see – I mean, I never realised it would take so long 
for somebody to actually die in that situation. 
 Int:  How long did it take? 
 Inga:  Well, I just thought it’ll – his heart will stop, you know. And 
the thing was, it started slowing down and we were all holding 
him and everything. And then it sort of stopped and it flat 
lined. And you know we thought, ‘Oh God, that’s it’. And then 
it started again. And it kept doing this. So we didn’t know, we 
kept thinking, ‘Oh, is he or isn’t he?’ Oh, it was awful, it was 
absolutely horrible. It felt like it was about ten minutes. It was 
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probably maybe half that. But it was just horrendous, abso-
lutely horrendous. Sorry, I’m reliving it (tearful). 
 Int:  I can understand that. Did you wish you hadn’t been there? 
 Inga:  No, no. We had to be there. You know I couldn’t have left him 
then. 
 Keith similarly talks about the rituals of saying goodbye to his brain-
dead daughter. He says she was ‘dead’ – ‘as far as they [the doctors] were 
concerned’, but it is clear that for him she was not ‘gone’ until after the 
machines were switched off. 
 Keith:  It was global [brain injuries] in the end. It got worse and 
worse. It sort of spread, the swelling became bigger [ ... ] She 
was clinically dead once immediately the machine went off. 
 Int:  The machine being the ventilator? 
 Keith:  Yes [ ... ] We were told that it was hopeless, and it was their 
opinion that the minute that they turned the vent off that 
she would die. In fact she was dead as far as they were 
concerned without the machine. So people just filed in, [ ... ] 
to say their goodbyes and that was awful. [ ... ] And very soon 
she was almost gone instantly there was just nothing there 
when they did it. 
 These extracts confirm what previous research has demonstrated (Lock, 
2002) – that ‘brain death’ is often not actually treated by relatives as 
‘really dead’. In these scenarios the already brain-dead are ‘actually 
dying’ (and take 5–10 mins to do it) or are only ‘gone’ after the venti-
lator is turned off. The recent Jahi McMath case offers a particularly 
graphic case of a family’s refusal to accept that a brain-dead patient is 
really ‘dead’ – and some media reports explicitly related this case to those 
of PVS/MCS patients (for example http://content.time.com/time/maga-
zine/article/0,9171,2162277–1,00.html). Although recognising that the 
medics spoke of the person as ‘already dead’ what our interviewees treat 
as (real) death is cardiovascular death (as signalled by the flat-lining of 
the monitor). This is a firmly biological rather than consciousness-based 
definition of death – even though this wife and this father accept that 
consciousness has gone (that is, the person is brain dead) and even (at 
an intellectual level) that this means the person is ‘dead’, there is still 
something very compelling about being with a body that is warm and 
breathing (albeit with a ventilator) which leads us to experience it as 
‘alive’. But, these interviewees had only a few days of experiencing a body 
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without consciousness. In the rest of our analysis we address how families 
experience being with relatives who have no (or minimal) consciousness 
long term. As with ‘brain dead’ patients, the vegetative and minimally 
conscious patients started off in intensive care – but, unlike them, they 
have survived independently of ventilators: they are not ‘gone’ (that is 
‘brain dead’) and there has been no final ‘goodbye’. How then do inter-
viewees talk about life and death in relation to these patients? 
 The way in which interviewees explicitly tried to present their 
relative as living or dead to some extent mapped onto their views 
about the meaning of life. For some interviewees life, at all cost, was 
to be valued and should not be discriminated against. Life without 
consciousness was still life (or at least retained the possibility of 
recovery for future life). For others, however, the disordered state of 
consciousness fundamentally compromised the meaning and quality 
of life. Families whose relatives had clear PVS diagnoses (especially 
those who were seeking the discontinuation of life-sustaining treat-
ment) often made the strongest statements about their relative being 
at least ‘not alive’: ‘she’s existing, she isn’t living’ (Natalie); ‘she died 
four years ago’ (Harry); ‘It’s Colin’s body being kept alive somehow. 
He’s not in it anymore’ (Jade); ‘He’s already dead’ (Brian). (For further 
discussion see Holland et al., 2014.) For them the continued artificial 
maintenance of the body was unnatural or perverse. However, even 
some relatives who were  in favour of ongoing life sustaining treat-
ment sometimes revealed a different perspective through ‘slips of the 
tongue’ while talking to us. Kathy, for example, had strong spiritual 
beliefs that her sister’s current state of suspension was ‘for a reason’ 
but said of her sister: ‘if Bella were  alive – oh! Say again! If Bella were 
 awake , conscious ... ’ 
 Family members who felt their loved one would be ‘better off dead’ 
also sometimes emphasised that their relative was actually very much 
alive – with present experience and sensations. It was unusual for family 
members to view their relative as ‘comfortable’ – twitching, grim-
acing, and teeth grinding can make the vegetative body/person appear 
distressed. Seizures may also occur. And minimally conscious patients 
are known to experience pain. Indeed interviewees with an MCS rela-
tive sometimes looked back on a time when their relative showed no 
awareness at all with something like nostalgia: ‘It was better when he 
was vegetative’, comments one, ‘there was just emptiness’. 
 Perceived suffering was part of the rationale some relatives had for 
speaking of their relative as very much alive and contrasting this explic-
itly with being dead – a state for which they used terms such as ‘at 
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peace’. (For further discussion see Kitzinger and Kitzinger, 2014.) One 
interviewee, for example, while accepting the experts’ PVS diagnosis for 
her relative was adamant about the horrendous nature of his life:
 If you start mucking around with the brain you can be left with what 
did happen, and that is worse than death you know. [ ... ] People don’t 
want to believe that people are living such horrendous lives. They go 
‘oh I’m sure there’s something’. Well no there isn’t always something. 
Life  isn ’t always better than death. And it shouldn’t be life at all costs. 
(Rose) 
 This interviewee, in this context repeatedly uses the words ‘living’, and 
‘life’ – emphasising the horror of continued existence in such a state. 
She went on to argue that active euthanasia should be available in such 
circumstances. 
 What caused someone to still be alive? 
 All of these families’ relatives would have died without medical inter-
vention and interviewees whose relatives had been resuscitated often 
talked about their relative as having ‘actually died’– but death having 
been ‘arrested’ or ‘reversed’. Frieda says her mother, injured in a riding 
accident: ‘kept on dying’ but a doctor at the scene kept reviving her 
until the ambulance arrived and that ‘she died several times’ in the 
ambulance ‘but they kept her going’. Ann says her daughter drowned 
and ‘did really die’ at the site where she was found. Felicity says her 
partner, who collapsed with a brain infection : ‘ actually did die, once for 
six minutes and once for eight’. 
 The way these interviewees talk about their relatives (near) death is 
inflected through their perception of their loved one’s present state or 
potential future condition. When Ann, for example, declared that her 
daughter (who remains in a vegetative state after many years) ‘really did 
die’ at the accident site, her other daughter (in an interview with the 
two women jointly) added ‘we do find it stupid that they didn’t leave 
it at that’. By contrast Felicity, who (against all medical advice) passion-
ately maintains a belief in her partner’s future recovery, talks as if she 
imagines regaling him with the tale and speculates about the impact of 
having died on his future appreciation of life:
 He has died twice, (laughs) do you know what I mean [ ... ] And I 
can’t see how he would not have different appreciation for life now. 
Especially when he realises that ‘you died, do you know, you died 
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twice, and you nearly died every day for months and months and 
months’ [ ... ] me and a friend of his always joke that we’re going to ask 
Nin if he saw the light. ‘What did you see, Nin? What did you see?’ 
 The meaning of such closeness to, or return from, death is also presented 
in different ways depending on interviewees’ attitude toward the past, 
present and future. Some of the interviewees thereby construct the 
‘natural death’ in negative relation to the ‘artificial life’. One mother, 
for example, talked angrily about the medical system that had inter-
vened to prolong her daughter’s life against the wishes of the family 
(and, she believes, her daughter’s own wishes). She described her daugh-
ter’s current existence as a kind of ‘artificial life’, created by doctors who 
have no respect for who her daughter had been and no knowledge of 
the family’s culture: ‘we’re acting as if these are people from outer space 
and we can somehow keep them going and it’s very clever of us’. A 
similar perspective was presented by another interviewee who described 
how medics operated to save her mother’s life against the wishes of the 
family. This interviewee reflects bitterly on the fact that by the time 
clinicians did eventually decide to turn off her mother’s life support 
it was too late – the crisis was over and the body’s instinct for survival 
ensured her mother kept breathing:
 It seems sort of bitter and ironic that, [ ... ] they’d given her [ ... ] just 
enough time for her to gather just enough strength to muster up a 
hold. [ ... ] they’d intervened massively once and then, just as signifi-
cantly, a second time [with operations]. And she didn’t die when they 
turned off life support. Off she went – breathe, breathe. 
 By contrast other interviewees interpreted the continued existence of 
their relative against all predictions as a sign that the patient had a 
positive motivation to survive and would defy the grim statistics about 
the severe impairments they were likely to face if they ever did recover 
consciousness. Stavos, who, like Felicity, apparently anticipates a time 
when he will be able to communicate with his brother, sees his survival 
as evidence of his brother’s determination to live and looks forward to 
helping his brother write a book about his experience. Other families do 
not imagine such high-level recovery, but still see ongoing survival as 
indication of a higher spiritual purpose, or the hand of God. Kathy, for 
example, thinks her sister still has a ‘purpose’ in life, if not for herself 
then for others, and Felicity reacts to the fact her husband survived two 
prolonged cardiac arrests, by declaring: ‘If that man was meant to die, 
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I believe God would have took him then [during the cardiac arrests]. 
That’s my faith.’ Felicity’s account recalls confrontational encounters 
with doctors reluctant to keep treating him and describes the impression 
she was left with after one such meeting with a consultant who wanted 
to switch off her husband’s ventilator:
 I said, ‘you can’t do that, do you know, he’s a man, he’s my partner, 
I’ve got a baby, he’s my baby’s dad’ [ ... ] And he [the consultant] 
started saying to us [ ... ] ‘I will not keep a slab of meat, that’s all he 
will be, a slab of meat alive in my room, I won’t do that, that’s undig-
nified [ ... ] he will just be dead but in the body’ – do you know, I can’t 
remember the words now, it was just he had no compassion for us. 
He was just getting his point across. 
 Months later another consultant questioned Felicity’s insistence on 
aggressive intervention (Nin’s weight had dropped to under six and a 
half stone and he was having regular seizures) and Felicity successfully 
argued for treatment again:
 I guess some people feel [ ... ] that people are trying to die and you’re 
not letting them [ ... ] But I hope that I have the right judgement to 
make that decision, if I felt that Nin was ready to go, that he’d had 
enough [ ... ] But then again, I’d probably leave it up to God because 
when Nin’s time to go is to go, I don’t think it matters what equip-
ment I would use. 
 Relationships, ‘social death’ and ‘life’ 
 Definitions of death have been well-researched in the context of 
defining ‘brain death’ for the purposes of organ harvesting (Lock, 2002). 
However, another reason why it matters whether a person is ‘dead’ or 
‘alive’ is because of the implications for  relationships . (See, for example, 
Behuniak, 2011, on ‘social death’.) The picture that emerged from our 
interviews was complex and somewhat double-edged. Some of these 
relatives declared their loved one ‘gone’. A husband, for example, said 
of his wife ‘to all extent and purposes, she no longer exists’ and a mother 
said of her son ‘his body’s just going to outlive him ... It’s like a bereave-
ment but you can’t grieve and they [care staff] keep telling me he’s not 
dead’. Interviewees sometimes use images when describing their relative 
that are alien, inanimate or animalistic (for example ‘zombie’, ‘husk’, 
‘dummy’ – for a critique of such language see Behuniak, 2011). This 
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could lead for them to fight for ‘death with dignity’ – a desire to bury 
the body that was outliving the person. On the other hand some (some-
times the  same people) emphasised that their relative was very much 
still alive, and use this to assert the patient’s claim to social acknowledg-
ment and respectful and interactive care. Tania reacts angrily to friends 
and acquaintances who have stopped asking about his son declaring 
‘he’s still alive’. Morag makes a similar assertion in her message to staff:
 Don’t talk over him like he’s a piece of meat or like he’s not even 
there; or like he’s already dead because he’s not. ... he’s a living, 
breathing human being. 
 Although everyone wanted the person/body treated with care and respect 
for some interviewees the ‘death’ (or at least absence of personhood) meant 
there was no reason to visit, that energy should be focused on ‘the living’ 
(such as their children), or that visits were simply out of duty and involved 
‘going through the motions’. Individuals were often ambivalent and fami-
lies occasionally split around such decisions – for example a mother might 
continue to visit, but a husband declare there was no point, or one family 
member may wish ‘life-sustaining’ treatment to continue, the other to 
allow death. Some were critical of other relatives and the role they had 
adopted in relation to the patient. One, for example, reflects negatively on 
the way her son’s grandmother has moved in on her son’s life – ‘it is as if 
she owns him’; another describes a mother’s (in his view misguided) devo-
tion to maintaining her son’s life and visiting him every day:
 It was the mother that insisted that he [her son in a vegetative state] 
was going to get considerably better and also that she was communi-
cating with him, she knew what he wanted, she knew what he was 
saying, and then she died, [ ... ] what sort of sick joke is that. You know 
she’s killed herself trying to keep him alive and he’s dead anyway. 
 Some interviewees were also self-critical about quite what they were 
devoted to. One woman said she thought she was keeping her husband 
alive ‘for me’, rather than for his own sake. A mother, caring for her 
vegetative daughter at home reflects that it is a bit like keeping a human 
being ‘as a pet’:
 What we’re doing could be seen as a selfish act [keeping our loved 
one alive]. Because we don’t want to lose them. We want to keep 
them here with us. But all you’re keeping is a shell. 
10.1057/9781137391919.999 - ‘This In-Between’, Celia Kitzinger and Jenny Kitzinger
Do
wn
lo
ad
ed
 fr
om
 w
ww
.p
al
gr
av
ec
on
ne
ct
.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 n
pg
 - 
Pa
lg
ra
ve
Co
nn
ec
t -
 2
01
4-
07
-2
3
‘This In-Between’ 253
 However, some interviewees felt there was still some point to their 
relative’s life – some connection either through subtle communica-
tion such as eye opening or through their ongoing social roles with 
or without active participation (‘he’s my partner ... .he’s my baby’s 
dad’). Morag, for example, appreciated the many years in which her 
father had survived in a vegetative (or probably minimally conscious) 
state:
 To have had him there, at least, you know, we could tell him about 
our GCSEs [school examinations at 16 years old], we could tell him 
about our A Levels [examinations at 18 years old]. And I remember my 
cousin got married and we were bridesmaids and we went between 
the church and the reception, we went to the hospital and we left our 
bouquets in the hospital and had photos taken with him. You know, 
so he was still part of what was going on. 
 Morag emphases the ongoing social relationship with her father 
through her own growing up and is grateful he was still part of their 
lives, although she added ‘but on the other hand, our lives stopped for 
nearly a decade, particularly my mum’s’. However, two women involved 
in our research actually saw their lives as in some ways improved by 
their partner being in a disordered state of consciousness. One saw 
her partner being in a coma as ‘easier than breaking up’ and found 
visiting ‘peaceful’ and ‘connected’. Another also talked of the pleasure 
she took in visiting her husband and described the dramatic change in 
their relationship once he was in a vegetative (or possibly minimally 
conscious) state. Through fighting for him to continue to receive treat-
ment, she had found her own power and voice within a relationship 
in which she had previously been very disempowered and controlled 
by him (Saunders et al., in press). In both cases these women wanted 
 life-sustaining  treatment to continue in spite of opposition from other 
family members and/or clinicians. 
 The spirit and the soul – memory, funerals and resolution 
 Whether or not they were religious many interviewees evoked a concept 
of ‘spirit’ or soul. Some made comments about medical science ‘trap-
ping’ the soul in the body artificially, others saw ‘the soul’ as making 
a choice to stay – and ideas about spirituality and the meaning of life 
were mobilised in thinking about death. One mother commented that 
allowing her daughter to die would be a positive move, better than 
keeping her trapped in her body:
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 Do you know in a way, it sounds too goofily spiritual perhaps, but I 
don’t believe death is the end – we have an effect on life, the future, 
other people’s lives beyond our own death, or can have. So I don’t 
think it’s like a door slamming. 
 Memory of the person who had ‘gone’ was often crucial to interviewees’ 
judgment. Interviewees talked of wanting to remember their loved one 
as they had been (‘vibrant’, ‘alive’) and emphasised the importance of 
how their relatives  themselves would want to be remembered. 
 Fantasies about funerals were often linked with closure, memory 
and commemoration. 2 Ann, whose daughter has been in a vegetative 
state for many years, recalled how at the beginning: ‘I thought it would 
be nice to have a month to say goodbye’ but when she was told her 
daughter might survive for years:
 I was very aware at the time that I wanted to remember Fiona as she 
was. I didn’t want it to drag on for months and I didn’t want my 
memory of Fiona to be these months and months of suffering. 
 Ann’s other daughter, Bea (in a joint interview), explained how she planned 
the funeral, going through all her sister’s favourite CDs to choose music 
for the event. She contrasts being able to choose music with the difficulty 
of choosing ‘least worst’ options in relation to medical treatment. 
 I was really pleased that I’d had the chance to do that. She’d be really 
pleased with the decisions made for her funeral [ ... ] Planning a really 
nice do, and choosing the music was a decision on something that I 
could be proud of planning for her. 
 Other families also talked at length about the funerals that they had 
planned, but never been able to have. Diane, whose mother had been 
injured when Diane was still a teenager, commented:
 I fantasize about [ ... ] her funeral basically – being able to be united 
and to celebrate her and you know remember her in a sort’ve ... not 
in this [ ... ] this blackness that lives with you, that sort of plunging 
despair that lives inside you [ ... ] It would’ve been a tragedy that Mum 
had died [ ... ] ... but it would’ve been ... we would’ve been able to go 
forward. As it is we’re stuck, all of us, behind this glass wall and when 
she dies ... although it’s been so long, you kind of imagine it’s all going 
to be okay when she dies. 
10.1057/9781137391919.999 - ‘This In-Between’, Celia Kitzinger and Jenny Kitzinger
Do
wn
lo
ad
ed
 fr
om
 w
ww
.p
al
gr
av
ec
on
ne
ct
.c
om
 - 
lic
en
se
d 
to
 n
pg
 - 
Pa
lg
ra
ve
Co
nn
ec
t -
 2
01
4-
07
-2
3
‘This In-Between’ 255
 Diane’s older sister, in a separate interview, also talked of thinking about 
her mother’s funeral. 
 I go through phases of dreaming about Mum’s funeral but dreaming 
about talking to her as she’s dying about, talking to her in her coffin 
endlessly, [ ... ] There’s a lot of, kind of, turmoil around the idea of her 
dead and not dead, dead and not dead, here and not here. You know 
it’s the, the sort of, it’s just the unresolved ...  
 Conclusion 
 This chapter has highlighted ordinary understandings of death as they 
are mobilised in extraordinary circumstances by families of severely 
brain-injured individuals. The analysis underlines that death, as also 
other chapters of this volume make clear, is not a fixed category – and 
death and dying derive their meanings through contingent signifying 
relations. New technologies, and ways of deploying those technologies, 
have created new forms of liminal beings who occupy an ambiguous 
position (‘dead and not dead, here and not here’) and our interviews 
with family members highlight the work done by family members as 
they try to deal with, and make sense of, the challenges this throws up 
for them in the context of their own experiences, cultures, religious and 
spiritual beliefs, knowledge of their relative’s values, their own relation-
ships and wishes, and their engagement with the legal–medical system. 
 Family members negotiate different constructions of life – the biolog-
ical (the still warm body and beating heart), the consciousness based para-
digm (focused on the patient’s awareness) and relational elements (the 
place of the person in the family). Such negotiations take place against 
a background of uncertainty and shifts over time (because the ‘perma-
nence’ of the disordered state of consciousness is only confirmed after 
months or even years) and sometimes very confusing experiences at the 
bedside (when the patient may display behaviours that raise questions 
about their level of awareness). Any simple reclassification of the being 
as ‘dead’ is complicated by the warm, breathing body, the organisation of 
care around sustaining ‘life’ (often in the apparently ‘domestic’ and non-
medicalised setting of a long-term ‘care home’ or ‘rehabilitation centre’), 
and the social space occupied by the individual (as husband, son, sister 
or partner). It is also complicated by the uncertainty families may experi-
ence about when, and if, the state has become permanent, and whether 
their relative might just have some minimal consciousness – as well as 
the values they themselves place on different meanings of life. 
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 It is not surprising that our data show that families explicitly negotiate, 
and struggle, with these challenges. They take explicit positions about 
whether their loved one is dead or alive, but then stumble over words in 
trying to make sense of the situation – sometimes referring to their rela-
tive as dead, but correcting themselves, or speaking about the patient as 
both living and dead in the same sentence. It is also not surprising that 
different ways of looking at the body/person can be a source of conflict – 
sometimes between families and friends, but more Often, in our data, 
between families and professionals. This was evident, for example, for 
the mother who feels doctors have created ‘artificial life’ in sustaining 
her daughter, and the other who says that staff ‘keep telling me he’s not 
dead’. The same conflict is apparent in the words of the daughter who 
admonished staff: ‘he’s [not] a piece of meat ... . he’s a living, breathing 
human being’, and in the report of the wife who describes her horror at 
the intensivist who dismissed her husband as ‘dead but in the body’ and 
wanted to treat him as simply ‘a slab of meat’. 
 This chapter illustrates that social constructionist/ivist approaches to 
death are not limited to the ivory towers of academia, but, for these 
families, become an integral part of trying to make sense of the experi-
ences and systems they confront under the most traumatic of circum-
stances. Close attention to such accounts will help round out social 
constructionist/ivist accounts, place abstract theorising about the ‘PVS’ 
category in context and may suggest how understandings of discourses 
around death may help families and clinicians, and assist in framing 
policy and practice – including the delivery of so-called ‘life-sustaining’ 
treatment. 
Acknowledgements:
This paper was part-funded by the ESRC (Ref: ES/K00560X/I) and by 
Research Priming Funds provided by the Wellcome Trust [ref: 097829/
Z/11/A] through the Centre for Chronic Diseases and Disorders (C2D2) 
at the University of York.
 Notes 
 1 .  For discussion of the challenges and opportunities of ‘insider research’ see 
Saunders et al. (under submission). 
 2 .  The importance of ritual in the marking of death has been explored in many 
studies, and the liminal has been theorised. For example, in some societies, 
the dead may not be quite dead until their bones have been exhumed or 
collected and then burned, cleaned and buried in another place from the first 
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internment. Therefore, between the biological death and the final recognition 
that the spirit has joined the spirit world, the ghost of the dead may walk the 
earth for a while. This is a liminal, in-between, transitional state (Kellehear, 
2007). 
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